Trump defense policy orated by Hegseth but scripted by Colby
"we should prepare ourselves to defend Taiwan. But [...] Taiwan isn’t itself of existential importance to America. Rather, our core interest is in denying China regional hegemony over Asia. Taiwan is
Realists cheer as Elbridge Colby named top DoD official for policy
Trump rounded out his E-Ring Sunday night offering a rare pick for those in the restrainer camp
By Kelley Beaucar Vlahos (Responsible Statecraft)
Dec 23, 2024
Elbridge Colby, who worked guiding Pentagon policy in first Trump administration and is an advocate of building up military assets and deterrence as a way to avoid future U.S. wars — particularly with China — has just been named the incoming Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
It is an important role, and one that realists and many restrainers are all too happy to go to Colby, who is the most representative of the realist approach to foreign policy that Trump has nominated or selected since winning the White House in November. Colby has openly said he opposed the Iraq war and every U.S. conflict/overseas intervention since, and has been a vocal critic of U.S. proxy war against Russia in Ukraine. He has supported Ukraine's campaign to defend itself, but says the war is not a first priority interest of the United States and warns that continuing Washington aid and weapons at the current pace won't make a difference there, while sapping U.S. resources for its own defenses.
His pick has realists, particularly on the Right, cheering, comparing him to an older tradition of U.S. foreign policy practitioners.
"Bridge Colby is arguably the leading conservative realist in U.S. defense and foreign policy today," notes Reid Smith, vice president of foreign policy at Stand Together, tells RS. "He hails from an intellectual tradition defined by statesmen like James Baker and Brent Scowcroft, who prioritized power and pragmatism over gauzy moralizing or rigid ideology. At the same time, his approach signals a generational shift toward a foreign policy grounded in reason, mindful of constraints, and informed by the lessons of past mistakes."
What Colby believes is the chief security interest of the U.S. is China and that is where some restrainers peel off. Colby has said Washington must preserve its weapons, and shift its energy and focus for accelerated defense industrial production, on China. While he wants to avoid, war, he believes, "(Chinese) are actively preparing for conflict. My view is to prevent them from dominating Asia without a war. But the only prudent way is to be prepared to fight to show Beijing that there is nothing to gain by initiating conflict.”
In that vein he sees Taiwan as the flashpoint. As he wrote in the Wall Street Journal in September:
"For about the past decade, I have been arguing in every available format that we should prepare ourselves to defend Taiwan. But my argument has always been that Taiwan isn’t itself of existential importance to America. Rather, our core interest is in denying China regional hegemony over Asia. Taiwan is very important for that goal, but not essential.
The key is to make Taiwan defensible at a reasonable level of cost and risk for Americans. This is a theme I developed at great length in my 2021 book. The sharpness and insistence of my arguments have been motivated by this precise fact: To make Taiwan defensible, America must focus on preparing for Taiwan’s defense and Taiwan must do more."
Some restrainers, even realists, believe that China's "desire to dominate Asia" is in itself a realist position for China and one that does not threaten the U.S. and therefore would not require the power projection that in fact might provoke the very war that Colby claims to want to avoid.
Interestingly, Colby's only serious detractors have been pro-Israel types who say he is "too dovish" on Iran, citing a column in 2012 taking a realist point of view on the debate over whether the U.S. should attack the Islamic Republic, or not:
But perhaps the most important argument against attacking Iran has received less attention. That is that none of the attack proponents can give a sensible answer to the question General David Petraeus posed at the beginning of the Iraq war: “How does this end?” (Matthew) Kroenig and other advocates for war note, correctly, that astrike against Iran could do substantial damage to Iran’s program. But they fail to explain how the United States will prevent Iran from simply restarting its program, this time in deadly earnest.
These critics, who cite Colby's 2021 co-written essay on reducing the U.S. military footprint in the Middle East as another datapoint in his "dovishness," fail to note that he has firmly stated his support of Israel's security, protecting Americans from the threat of transnational terrorism, and preventing "the domination of the oil-rich Gulf states by a potentially hostile power" as the three main U.S. interests in the region. In the same stated essay he says:
These (U.S.) interests can be served through a far more scoped and modest approach than the United States has pursued over the last generation—most notably through the “freedom agenda” but also through its efforts to broadly stabilize the Middle East. The United States should therefore reduce its military engagement and presence in the region, shifting burdens as much as possible to other, primarily 76 regional, actors. This last goal can best be pursued by supporting and bolstering the capabilities of Israel and regional states like the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt, whose interests on key issues broadly align with the United States.
Colby, during the Trump administration, also advised Trump to be cautious in sliding into war with Iran, which, despite the administration's assassination of IRGC commander Qassem Soleimani in early 2020, did just that. This was seen as a win for realists/restrainers in the Trump orbit like Tucker Carlson and Colby, who at the time wrote in the Wall Street Journal, "As the U.S. protects its interests in the Middle East, it must not allow its military focus to be wrested away from Asia." So again, his real sites are laser pointed eastward.
Colby is a major proponent of rebuilding the American defense industrial base. Trump's other pick announced last night, billionaire Stephen Feinberg as Deputy Secretary of Defense in charge of budgets, runs a major private equity firm overseeing a vast web of defense companies, so the two will compliment each other, no doubt in that regard, but the closeness of profit-making industrialists to strategy & policy is already giving some restrainers heartburn.
But Colby has had years of experience in government and in developing the intellectual firmament behind a "peace through strength" approach and many have breathed a sigh of relief that his position on China, which is decidedly more hawkish than the those who want a much less militarized posture, is not as ideologically driven and keen for a Cold War redux as others in the Republican orbit around Trump today.
https://responsiblestatecraft.org/elbridge-colby-pentagon-trump/
China between Philippines and Trump
As the second Trump administration assembled, the Philippines appeared relatively sanguine about the prospects of stronger bilateral relations. The elevation of China hawks such as new Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who has argued for stronger assistance to Asian allies, was encouraging to Manila, which has been grappling with festering maritime disputes with Beijing in the South China Sea.
The appointment of so-called “prioritisers” such as Elbridge Colby as undersecretary for policy at the Pentagon was just as reassuring. After all, Colby, the former architect of the 2018 National Defence Strategy, has been a major proponent of an Asia-focused American foreign policy away from traditional theatres such as the Middle East and Europe. His new boss, Pete Hegseth, as well as new National Security Adviser Mike Waltz, have echoed similar positions, underscoring the centrality of the Indo-Pacific to the second Trump administration.
The main concern with Trump was his notoriously transactionalist streak coupled with strategic incoherence and temperamental unpredictability. But this was something that most Asian allies thought they had deftly managed during Trump’s first stint at the White House.
Yet a more troubling prospect now confronts frontline allies such as the Philippines, namely the elevation of isolationist figures, who have been openly advocating for a new strategic understanding, if not a “grand bargain”, with Beijing. As if that wasn’t troubling enough, Trump himself has repeatedly extended the olive branch to main adversaries and has openly welcomed a potential “G2” (“Group of Two”) condominium with China.
Signs of trouble came early on. In an unprecedented move, Trump invited Xi Jinping to his inauguration, while reversing the ban on China’s most famous social media app, Tiktok, despite vehement opposition by Republican allies. “It is my expectation that we will solve many problems together, and starting immediately. We discussed balancing Trade, Fentanyl, TikTok, and many other subjects,” Trump wrote in a social media post just hours before reoccupying the White House. “President Xi and I will do everything possible to make the World more peaceful and safe,” he added, underscoring his penchant for dealmaking with fellow world leaders.
In fairness, Trump had made his position clear soon after he re-secured the presidency last year. During a press briefing at Mar-a-Lago, he nonchalantly declared: “China and the United States can together solve all the problems of the world, when you think about it.” And then there is the curious case of Trump’s entrepreneur-turned-consiglieri, Elon Musk, who could play a critical role in brokering a “grand bargain” between the two superpowers. Not only does Musk have huge investments in China and robust personal ties with the Chinese leadership, the tech billionaire has positioned himself as potential partner/purchaser of TikTok in America. He has also often parroted Beijing’s line on sensitive geopolitical issues, recently describing Taiwan as an “integral part of China”, while instructing Space X suppliers to move out of the self-ruling island nation.
The Pentagon’s new Southeast Asia chief, John Andrew Byers, is also seen as troubling, having openly advocated for a “cooperation spiral” with China in the South China Sea that could completely sideline if not undermine Philippine interests. Byers proposed “remov[ing] US military forces or weapons systems from the Philippines in exchange for the China Coast Guard executing fewer patrols” in disputed areas. Byers has downplayed the importance of deterrence in order to “reduce threat perceptions and eliminate imaginary fears that, if maintained, will surely become self-fulfilling prophecies”.
Moreover, the Philippines will have to constantly engage with and work in lockstep with sympathetic key figures within the Trump administration, from Marco Rubio to Elbridge Colby, who value the Southeast Asian nation’s centrality to preserving a rules-based order in the region. After all, the Philippines’ geographical location – at the interstices of the South China Sea, Bashi Channel and Philippine Sea – makes it indispensable to any effective American military contingency over Taiwan or regional ally. The Philippines must resist being reduced to a pawn in a great power bargain.
Now boasting one of the fastest-growing economies in Asia, the Philippines should also rapidly build up its own defence capabilities, embracing a “multi-aligned” approach that lessens its dependence on Washington in favour of a diversified foreign policy. Its newly-ratified Reciprocal Access Agreement with Japan should be a first major step in consolidating a broader network of security partnerships, including with Australia, Canada, South Korea, India, and European countries. Ultimately, a more capable and self-reliant Philippines will be better positioned to strike its own “art of the deal” with a transactionalist-isolationist Trump administration.