Oman's "Third Space"
Oman serves as a crucial back channel between Iran and the US as tensions flare in the Middle East,
The Facilitator
By Kristian Coates Ulrichsen Published: April 17, 2024 9.50pm BST
Prior to launching a barrage of drones and missiles at Israel on April 13, 2024, Iran reportedly got word to Washington that its response to an earlier strike on its embassy compound in Syria would seek to avoid major escalation. The message was conveyed via the Gulf Arab state of Oman.
The current crisis in the Middle East is one that officials in Oman have spent years trying to avoid. Located across the Strait of Hormuz from Iran, and with close defense and security ties to the U.S. and the U.K., Oman is aware that tit-for-tat attacks raise the risk of a broader war that would engulf countries and armed nonstate groups across the region.
Full-blown war could be triggered by further escalatory actions by Tehran or Jerusalem. But it could also occur through miscalculation or misunderstanding, especially given the lack of official bilateral channels for dialogue and de-escalation.
And this is where Oman steps in. For years, the Gulf state has quietly built a track record of easing regional tensions through diplomacy. It has continued to play this role since the Oct. 7 attack by Hamas. In the months since that assault and Israel’s response in Gaza inflamed the region, Oman has held high-level dialogues with Iran, hosted British Foreign Secretary David Cameron for talks on security in the Red Sea, and called for a cease-fire in Gaza.
It could now play a crucial role in keeping a channel of communication open between the U.S. and Iran as parties seek to tamp down tensions.
Standing apart from regional rivalries
Along with neighboring Qatar and Kuwait – as well as Switzerland, which representsU.S. interests in Iran in the absence of an American embassy – Oman has played a critical role in back-channel diplomacy.
But Oman’s approach is distinct from that of other nations. Rather than participating in direct talks, it creates space for dialogue, serving as a facilitator rather than a mediator.
Multiple reasons account for the Omani decision to act as a facilitator. Unlike several of the other Gulf states, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, Oman lacks a history of tense relations with Iran.
Rather, Omanis recall that Iran under the shah provided support to Oman during the 1970s when the Gulf state’s then young new sultan, Qaboos bin Said, was fighting a decadelong uprising in the southern province of Dhofar.
Even after the shah was ousted in the 1979 Iranian revolution and replaced by a clerical regime headed by Ayatollah Khomeini, Oman stood apart from others in the region and declined to get involved in regional rivalries and competition for geopolitical influence that marred Iran’s ties with other Gulf states.
Secret back channels
Representing a small state in a volatile region, Omani officials have created diplomatic spaces that permit them to engage with regional issues on their own terms and in ways that play to their strengths. As Sayyid Badr Albusaidi, a career diplomat who became the Omani foreign minister in 2020, noted back in 2003, “We try to make use of our intermediate position between larger powers to reduce the potential for conflict in our immediate neighborhood.”
Unlike Qatar, which has attracted worldwide attention over its role as a mediator in Hamas-Israel negotiations, Oman engages less in mediation and more in facilitation.
This is an important distinction and one the Omanis have maintained in regards to engaging with U.S. and Iranian officials, as well as Saudi and Houthi representatives during the decade-long Yemeni civil war.
Omani facilitation takes varied forms. It can consist of passing messages and maintaining indirect channels of communication between adversaries or arranging back channels and hosting discreet meetings.
There is little of the publicity seen in Qatar’s mediation initiatives, such as the talks with the Taliban that produced the 2020 Doha Agreement for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan.
But Oman’s approach can nonetheless yield results. In his memoir, “The Back Channel,” written after his retirement from the State Department and before his appointment as President Joe Biden’s director of the CIA, William Burns provided a detailed account of the Omani role in facilitating the back channel between U.S. and Iranian officials in 2013 that evolved into negotiations that produced the the Iran nuclear deal of 2015.
That back channel began after Iranian officials passed a message through Oman to the U.S. in 2012 suggesting a meeting in Muscat, the Gulf state’s capital.
Burns recalled that the head of Omani intelligence “greeted both delegations as we walked into the meeting room” and “offered a few brief words of welcome and then departed.”
The back channel remained secret throughout eight rounds of generally constructive dialogue that marked the longest and most sustained engagement between Iranian and U.S. officials since 1979.
Hosting adversaries
While the thaw between the U.S. and Iran didn’t last, the Omani back channel highlighted several factors key to the success of any attempt to dial down tensions between seemingly implacable adversaries.
The trust both sides had in Omani officials was critical, and the positive outcome of the meetings built confidence in each side’s use of Omani channels.
Oman’s role as a facilitator of indirect engagement between the U.S. and Iran assumed added importance with President Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw the U.S. from the Iran nuclear deal in 2018 and the failure of the Biden administration to reenter the agreement.
Seemingly the only time Oman has not been willing to serve this role – when tensions soared after the U.S. killing of Iranian Gen. Qassim Soleimani in January 2020 – was because Sultan Qaboos was critically ill. In Oman’s absence, the Swiss led the back channel.
Tamping down tensions
During the heightened tensions since the Oct. 7 attack in Israel, Oman has passed on messages between Iranian and U.S. officials. In January 2024, Omani officials hosted delegations of senior negotiators from both countries, shuttling between the representatives in separate rooms.
Even as a wider regional conflict loomed in the Middle East after Israel presumably bombed an Iranian embassy compound in Damascus on April 1, Oman was on hand to try to tamp down tensions.
On April 7, Iran’s foreign minister, Hossein Amirabdollahian, visited Oman – providing an opportunity for Omani officials to debrief the U.S. and other Western officials on Iran’s thinking as Tehran planned its response to the Damascus attack.
And while the current crisis in the Middle East is of a magnitude that Oman alone cannot address, the ability of trusted intermediaries such as Oman – along with Qatar and Switzerland – to keep open channels of communication is crucial to minimizing the possibility of any accidental escalation on the Iranian side, and to complementing U.S. and European dialogue with Israeli leaders in the quest to find a peaceful resolution to the standoff.
Read more here.
Oman and Multipolarity in the Gulf
(Amended)
Amid Hamas’ October 7, 2023, attacks on southern Israel and the latter’s aggressive retaliation against Gaza, the government of Oman has repeatedly called for the withdrawal of Israel’s military forces from the enclave and strongly denounced the Israel Defense Forces’ “brutal aggression“ against Palestinian civilians. Oman’s official stance on the conflict highlights its proposed solutions for a long-term peace: an immediate ceasefire, followed by a transition to dialogue initiatives that center on the crucial goal of recognizing Palestinian statehood.
Talking to Anyone
On its face, Oman’s position on the war in Gaza bears striking similarity to those adopted by most of the Gulf states, including countries as varied as Saudi Arabia and Iran. The Omani and Iranian foreign ministers have expressed their country’s mutual support to the Palestinian people, as have the Omani and Saudi foreign ministers in a demonstration of GCC unity. However, while there is broad agreement among the Gulf states on the disproportionate nature of Israel’s military campaign and the need for an immediate ceasefire, they differ in their positions towards Hamas. The militant group has been largely condemned, even within the Arab world, for its repressive rule in Gaza, its use of funds to construct underground tunnels for itself but not protection for Palestinian civilians, and its commitment to carry out further atrocities against Israeli civilians. Since October 7, Oman has carefully positioned itself among the nations that have actively advocated to include the group in official dialogue efforts.
Oman’s Foreign Minister, Badr bin Hamad Albusaidi, illustrated this vision in a lecturedelivered at the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies on February 16. Titled “Talking to Anyone for the Good of Everyone,” Albusaidi called for an emergency international conference on Palestinian statehood. He argued that while Hamas’ actions on October 7 were unconscionable, the group “cannot be eradicated. If there is ever to be peace,” he continued, “the peacemakers will have to find a way to talk to [Hamas], and listen.”
Hardliners in Israel and the West chafe at the idea of directly negotiating with Hamas, which both the United States and the European Union have designated a terrorist organization. But doing so would be remarkably inconsistent with Oman’s long-held approach to its foreign relations, which has long prized diplomatic relations—even with the most controversial parties. In Yemen, Oman has emphasized the necessity of engaging a wide array of actors, particularly the Houthis, in direct negotiations. This has made Muscat the venue of choice for tough talks, and Oman has emerged as the foremost diplomatic partner of all sides in the conflict.
The sultanate’s actions in the current crisis mirror long-standing practice. In recent decades, Oman has played an intermediary role in support of intra-regional dialogue. In 2013, discussions between the United States and Iran in Muscat eventually paved the way for the negotiation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), or “nuclear deal,” two years later. Though the United States withdrew from the deal in 2018, Oman-mediated discussions between the two sides quietly continued. The release of several American citizens from Iran in September 2023 was widely perceived as an attempt to reestablish the conditions for JCPOA negotiations. Crucially, in these endeavors, Oman only acted in moments when all sides had expressed willingness to proceed towards dialogue, and the Omani official positions did not openly contradict those of the other parties.
Today, as the Houthis began launching attacks against allegedly Israeli-linked vessels in the Red Sea and the United States and United Kingdom have sought to counter them, the Omani government has worked diligently to reduce tensions from both sides. Indeed, Oman’s central role drew British Foreign Secretary David Cameron, who paid a visit to Oman on January 30.
A Flexible Go-Between
The Omani official position vis-à-vis the Gaza conflict explicitly embraces the linkage between the violence there and the ongoing crisis in the Red Sea. As underlined by Abdullah Al Maani, a PhD candidate in the School of Government and International Affairs at Durham University, “Oman is actively engaged in efforts to de-escalate the Red Sea crisis by addressing its underlying cause: the Israeli occupation of Palestinian land.” As such, the Omani government has been very careful in showcasing its facilitation efforts and prioritizing intra-regional dialogue over a U.S.-led approach that would leave the status quo largely unchanged.
Moreover, despite Oman’s implicit rejection of the U.S. policy toward the Israel-Gaza war, the Omani government has not renounced negotiations with the Biden administration. In November 2023, the Omani Foreign Ministry openly aired the differences between the two country’s positions. Officials also spoke about the need for regional cooperation to prevent further escalation. Washington’s recent actions suggest a different tack. That the U.S. Department of State re-designated the Houthis a “Specially Designated Terrorist Group” (though not a “Foreign Terrorist Organization,” which is a slightly harsher classification) in January 2024 drives a wedge between Washington and Muscat, precluding the latter from getting all the major actors in one room.
Divergence from the United States’ position does not necessarily reduce Oman’s potential as a regional go-between. Currently, the most logical path forward for Oman would be to further strengthen the channels of communication between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which were re-opened in March 2023 (also thanks to Omani efforts). The Sultanate’s facilitation has proven effective in fostering dialogue between the Saudis, the Houthis, and the Iranians, and Oman has been recognized as playing a major role in securing Saudi and Houthi commitments to a ceasefire. At the moment, neither Riyadh nor the Houthis appear willing to relinquish opportunities for future dialogue, especially because they find themselves on (roughly) the same side of the Gaza conflict.
Though Omani diplomatic engagements suggest a longer-term effort to connect the Red Sea crisis to the Palestinian issue, Oman also needs to address concerns over the impact of the Houthi attacks. Although Oman’s exports are primarily directed eastwardtowards Asian markets, the crisis will eventually come to indirectly affect the Sultanate as global supply chains are threatened.
Embracing Multipolarity
To effectively neutralize the threat posed to the region by the Houthis while keeping a symbolic distance from the U.S.-led maritime security operation, Oman has strengthened its cooperation with outside powers that hold power projection capabilities, including India. The maritime dimension is a prominent example of the rise of multipolarity within the Gulf, but this trend extends beyond security. Oman’s Foreign Minister recently insistedon the need for reform at the UN Security Council, which perpetuates a Cold War-style, zero-sum logic among the world’s great powers. Oman has also increasingly joined India’s calls for a Global South dialogue, which would unite voices sidelined by traditional international institutions. In September 2023, Sultan Haitham was invited as a special guest to the G20 summit in New Delhi, and Oman took part in the second virtual “Voice of the Global South Summit” organized by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs in November 2023. There, the Sultanate acknowledged India’s important role in “facilitating a platform for global cooperation and discussions on critical international issues.”
The diversification of security and political partners has distant roots in Oman and the wider Gulf, but it seems to have been accelerated by the Israel-Gaza conflict and Washington’s subsequent maritime activities in the Red Sea, which have been perceived within the Arab world as intended to support Israel rather than to protect freedom of navigation. Thus far, Washington has struggled to convince the Gulf monarchies to decouple the Red Sea crisis from the Gaza crisis. Washington’s failure has caused not only its rivals, but also its regional allies to grow skeptical of the United States’ security role in the region and seek greater independence in their international affairs. This fluid situation may prove novel for some external observers—and even the United States. But for the Gulf monarchies, and Oman more than others, flexibility, and receptiveness has long been the name of the game. What seems to have changed is Oman’s greater willingness to express thought-provoking positions that openly challenge the U.S., embracing multipolarity not only in silent deeds but also in words.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Small State Diplomacy.
Issue: Geopolitics, U.S. – Gulf Policy
Country: Oman