NATO Expansion, Again!

NATO extending tentacles into Asia-Pacific will only end in failure, Why NATO Should Stay Out of Asia, NATO to launch 4 projects with Indo-Pacific partners, including AI and cyber.

Jul 10, 2024

NATO extending tentacles into Asia-Pacific will only end in failure

By Global Times

The 2024 NATO summit kicks off in Washington on Tuesday. This annual event has not only turned into a "rumor mill" for the "China threat" theory, but has also once again proven NATO's ambition to meddle in Asia-Pacific affairs.

The tactics the West has been using to garner attention on this event are nothing more than constant hyping of the "China threat" theory. Under the hype from the US and NATO, it seems that China has become the "key" to the survival of Europe, controlling the fate of the Russia-Ukraine conflict like a "decisive power." Moreover, NATO has invited Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, and Australia for three consecutive years and attempted to form an "Asia-Pacific NATO." This organization, which originally claimed to be "defensive," is now trying to prove it can "protect" the whole "Asia-Pacific" region.

NATO, which is celebrating its 75th anniversary but should have been ditched into the trash bin of history long ago, is now weak internally and facing numerous challenges. The uncertainty concerning the French parliamentary elections, the US upcoming presidential elections, and the increase in European defence spending have raised concerns. NATO is no longer a united organization on many issues. This already loose alliance, under the leadership of the US, is now hoping to build unity by spreading the rumor that "China is threatening regional security."

In fact, the US is not only aiming to contain China through NATO, but to control the entire Asia-Pacific region. In order to achieve this goal, NATO is trying to woo regional countries in many ways, constantly creating and exaggerating security crisis in the Asia-Pacific. As a result, some regional countries have fallen into this US trap. According to reports, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand have started coordinating with NATO to strengthen cooperation in areas such as cybersecurity and disinformation. There may be ulterior motives behind some regional countries' hasty involvement in NATO affairs, but this is a dangerous gamble that could easily lead these countries into the abyss.

Europe has witnessed turbulences, tensions and conflicts because of NATO. Now the US is intending to lead the bloc to reach more deeply into Asia, trying to establish an "Asia-Pacific NATO" to help achieve the US' "Indo-Pacific Strategy." This will only trigger opposition from the vast majority of regional countries.

"It is difficult for the 'Asia-Pacific NATO' to make any substantial breakthroughs," Xiang Haoyu, a research fellow at the China Institute of International Studies, told the Global Times. The Asia-Pacific region is fundamentally different from Europe in terms of ideology, values, and geography. It is impossible for the US and its allies in the region to establish a NATO-like alliance.

In addition, most countries in the Asia-Pacific were colonies or semi-colonies in the past, while many Western countries were colonizers who cannot empathize with regional countries and will only use their old colonial thinking to control the region.

Asia-Pacific countries are eager for peace and stability. The Asia-Pacific region is the engine of the global economy due to having peace and stability. If NATO, a military alliance whose mission is to disrupt and incite conflicts, stretches its tentacles further into the Asia-Pacific region, regional dynamics will be overshadowed by confrontation and turmoil instead of development and prosperity.

The Asia-Pacific region doesn't welcome NATO's meddling in the region. The vast majority of countries in the region want the US-led NATO to stop creating tensions, peddling the Cold War mentality, and provoking bloc confrontations in the region. The bloc shouldn't bring instability to the Asia-Pacific as it has done in Europe. Forcibly meddling in regional affairs will inevitably provoke stronger opposition against the transatlantic military bloc. NATO extending its influence further into Asia-Pacific will only end in failure.

Why NATO Should Stay Out of Asia

The Alliance Would Leave the Region Less, Not More, Secure

By Mathieu Droin, Kelly A. Grieco, and Happymon Jacob

Writing in Foreign Affairs last week, NATO’s secretary-general, Jens Stoltenberg, took aim at Beijing, condemning its support for Russia’s war in Ukraine and declaring that NATO had entered a new era of “enduring competition with China.” This situation “shows that in today’s world, security is not a regional matter but a global one,” he wrote, adding, “Europe’s security affects Asia, and Asia’s security affects Europe.” This is not a new idea. Stoltenberg has long championed a greater role for NATO in countering China’s rise. “Everything is intertwined,” he said in June, referring to European and Asian security at a joint press conference with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, “and therefore, we need to address these challenges together.”

Stoltenberg’s statements echoed a crucial pillar of U.S. President Joe Biden’s vision for countering China and Russia, as laid out in his administration’s October 2022 National Security Strategy: “We place a premium on growing the connective tissue—on technology, trade and security—between our democratic allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific and Europe.” NATO, with Washington’s backing, has made some progress toward this goal of strengthening cooperation with key partners in Asia. In 2022, for the first time in the alliance’s history, NATO officially identified China as a security challenge. The organization is now strengthening political dialogue and practical cooperation with its Indo-Pacific partners on a wide variety of issues including cyberdefense, new technologies, space, and maritime security.

The alliance has also boosted its visibility in the region. In another landmark first for the organization, in 2022, NATO observers attended regional military exercises in the Indo-Pacific. Acting in their national capacities, NATO allies such as France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom increasingly participate in large-scale military drills with Asian partners and have dispatched naval vessels to high-profile waters including the South China Sea amid rising tensions between China and its neighbors. At the Shangri-La Dialogue security conference in Singapore in June a high-ranking Chinese general accused Washington of trying to build an “Asia-Pacific version of NATO.” Lest anyone miss it, the alliance’s 75th-anniversary summit, beginning on July 9, will offer a very public reminder of NATO’s focus on the region. For the third consecutive year, the leaders or representatives of four non-NATO states—Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea, known as the Indo-Pacific Four (IP4)—will take to the NATO summit stage.

That NATO and its Asian partners are deepening their cooperation is clear. What is less clear is that this cooperation is in either’s best strategic interests. China’s assertiveness presents complex challenges, and transatlantic and Indo-Pacific security are interconnected in important ways, particularly because of closer collaboration between Beijing and Moscow. NATO, however, is not the correct forum for fostering transregional cooperation to counter China. Pulling the alliance into Asia fuels Beijing’s narrative of a U.S.-led confrontation between global blocs and risks alienating Asian countries without ultimately helping to shore up regional security or deterrence.

NATO can still contribute indirectly to Indo-Pacific security, however, by prioritizing the threat posed by Russia—and by building up European military capabilities that would allow the United States to pivot toward Asia. At the same time, the alliance should adopt a lower profile in Asia to avoid stoking Chinese paranoia and instead emphasize practical and discreet cooperation with the region. Instead of drawing NATO into Asia, policymakers should leverage the European Union’s considerable economic and diplomatic power to build transregional cooperation among Asian, European, and North American states, using a web of flexible and overlapping partnerships and issue-based coalitions. Only through such a network of close ties can the United States and its partners effectively counter threats that span the globe, but having NATO lead that effort would ultimately be counterproductive, leaving both Asia and Europe less, not more, secure.

SQUARE PEG IN A ROUND HOLE

NATO’s Indo-Pacific outreach may be a largely welcome development for its IP4 partners—particularly Japan, which has pursued close collaboration with the alliance in the face of mounting provocations from China as well as Russia. South Korea and New Zealand, however, have been more cautious in their engagement with the organization, given their extensive trade ties with China, as well as Seoul’s desire to secure Beijing’s cooperation on North Korea and Wellington’s long-standing tradition of foreign policy independence. Australia’s enthusiasm has varied over time, reflecting shifts in its domestic politics regarding support for a tough stance toward China. But NATO has a deeper problem: its engagement in Asia is out of sync with broader regional political dynamics, especially in South Asia and Southeast Asia, where many states fear it will destabilize the delicate balance that they strive to maintain in their relations with Washington and Beijing.

Even though concerns about Chinese aggression and lack of respect for international norms in arenas such as the South China Sea are steadily growing, most Asian countries tend not to perceive Beijing as an existential threat and in turn are unwilling to pick a side in the U.S.-Chinese rivalry. Depending on the issue at hand, Asian countries may seek to work with China, the United States, neither, or both. Indonesian President-elect Prabowo Subianto, for instance, stated in June that his country would “continue our strong cooperation with China” but “at the same time, we will work to expand and deepen our close partnership with the U.S. and the West.”

Many regional leaders—and some European ones—have expressed concern that NATO’s deepening involvement could not only force them to pick sides but also divide Asia into rival blocs. President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos, Jr., of the Philippines, for instance, has called on the region to reject a “Cold War mindset.” Policymakers throughout the Indo-Pacific are wary that NATO’s foray into Asia could constitute another step in Washington’s efforts to build a U.S.-led regional security bloc to counter China. These fears are fed by the legacy of European colonialism and Western intervention in the region and by uneasiness over NATO’s military approach. Kishore Mahbubani, formerly Singapore’s ambassador to the United Nations, for example, has warned that the “biggest danger” of NATO’s Indo-Pacific shift is that the alliance “could end up exporting its disastrous militaristic culture” to East Asia.

NATO is not a good fit for a region where states such as India and Indonesia have long traditions of not aligning with military alliances. And leaders in key capitals have pushed back on the idea of an “Asian NATO.” India’s External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, for example, referred in 2021 to the use of that term as a “mind game” and asserted that India has never had a “NATO mentality.” The power to set the country’s own path, he declared, is “my national choice.”

NATO has attempted to allay these fears, offering repeated assurances that it will neither move into the South China Sea nor admit Asian members. But skeptics and opponents of NATO in Asia remain unconvinced of the alliance’s intentions, especially as NATO now routinely invites top officials from IP4 countries to its summits and ministerial meetings. The alliance has also pushed for the opening of a liaison office in Japan. Nor has it helped the organization’s messaging when influential figures such as James Stavridis, NATO’s former supreme allied commander, have floated the idea of expanding the alliance to include Asian democracies. If NATO continues to insert itself into the Indo-Pacific, it is possible that some will see the alliance, rather than China, as a risk to regional security dynamics—alienating the very countries the United States and Europe need to balance Chinese power in the first place.

WORST OF ALL WORLDS

Supporters of engagement with Asia, both within the alliance and among NATO’s Asian partners, believe that these partnerships can enhance deterrence in the region. The organization is a military alliance, after all, so some observers imply that it could play some larger military role in Asia. At a minimum, the argument goes, the alliance could offer indirect support such as weapons, logistics, and intelligence sharing to Asian partners as well as to NATO member states choosing to intervene militarily under their national flags in a Taiwan Strait or South China Sea contingency. But it is unclear how this kind of deterrence would work in practice—and a more active NATO role in Indo-Pacific security could well backfire.

Rather than bolstering regional security, the alliance’s growing engagement with Asia could fuel insecurity and instability. Indo-Pacific states can see firsthand how NATO’s recent tilt feeds China’s paranoia, and they worry about being caught in the crossfire should a conflict break out. Beijing regularly accuses Washington of using the alliance as a “handy tool” for unifying its European and Asian allies into an “Asia-Pacific NATO” designed to “encircle” and “contain” China. Such rhetoric could be dismissed as Chinese propaganda, but many states in the region fear that Beijing could lash out if it felt it were backed against a wall. This kind of security dilemma would become more likely with a larger NATO presence in the region—and the alliance’s half-hearted military engagement and its less-than-perfect security assurances would offer scant protection for its Indo-Pacific partners.

Indeed, there are good reasons to doubt that NATO has the political will or military capabilities to make a meaningful contribution to Indo-Pacific security and deterrence. Many European allies would not be willing to support a NATO mission to check Chinese aggression in a far-off theater, either because they are busy dealing with Russia; because of their extensive economic ties with Beijing; or because Asia is, strictly speaking, not an existential interest for European countries.

The bulk of NATO’s enhanced cooperation consists of individually tailored partnerships with IP4 countries rather than “ironclad” security commitments, amounting more to cheap talk than credible signals of intent. As a result, Asian states are well aware that closing ranks politically with NATO in the absence of any security commitments could raise the risks of becoming a target. As the aftermath of Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia—and its invasions of Ukraine in 2014 and 2022—make clear, the alliance does not intervene directly to protect mere partners. NATO’s collective defense, via Article 5 of its founding treaty, applies only to full-fledged members, and is geographically limited via Article 6 to attacks occurring on their territory or their assets in “the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.” In a contingency affecting a regional partner—a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, for instance—NATO would have no obligation to intervene, and as a consensus-based organization, it would most likely remain on the sidelines.

Even if every NATO member wanted to intervene in Asia, the alliance has little to no spare capacity for operations thousands of miles away. European defense budgets are on the rise, spurred by Russia’s war in Ukraine, but those funds will be used primarily to replenish weapons sent to Ukraine, and to close urgent shortfalls for collective defense against Russia. Moreover, the type of military assets that NATO countries in Europe require for deterrence and defense on the continent—such as heavy artillery, antitank weapons, and tactical drones—are quite different from the maritime and air capabilities needed to project power into the Indo-Pacific. NATO is simply not equipped to deal with Asian contingencies.

NATO’s Asian proposition, in short, is the worst of all worlds: it feeds fears about the alliance’s intentions and infuriates Beijing without giving Asian partners the means to further deter China. Half-measures meant to counter China could end up sparking the very conflict the alliance is seeking to defuse.

IT’S NOT NATO OR NOTHING

Even if NATO avoids deeper involvement in Asia, however, greater European engagement in the region remains critical to countering China’s rising power and assertiveness. A reimagined European contribution to Asian security should proceed along several tracks. First, instead of trying to project military power into Asia, NATO’s European members should prioritize strengthening conventional deterrence and defense on their own territory, building up their own military capabilities to allow the United States to shift more resources to Asia. In keeping with this more indirect approach to Asian security, NATO should concurrently lower its public profile in the region, emphasizing tailored, discrete, and useful technical cooperation with the IP4 in areas such as intelligence threats, standardization of equipment, cybersecurity, and maritime security over high-profile military exercises and photo ops.

Transregional cooperation should also leverage Europe’s advantages—its diplomatic clout and economic, financial, and technological resources—to counter Beijing. Europe, the United States, and like-minded Asian partners should work together to promote good governance, particularly at the United Nations, where Chinese nationals have served in many leadership positions in recent years and used those opportunities to advance Beijing’s promotion of authoritarian rules and norms. NATO members must engage in diplomatic cooperation with Asian allies, including to jointly elect candidates to top UN positions, to effectively push back against Beijing’s efforts. Europe should also leverage its position as an economic powerhouse to expand trade and foreign direct investment with Asian partners, providing an economic counterweight to China. The European Union should start by finalizing free trade agreements with India, Indonesia, and the Philippines and delivering on its promise to invest 10 billion euros in areas such as sustainable infrastructure and digital connectivity in Southeast Asia through the Global Gateway initiative over the next few years. Most Asian countries are looking for more than just military assistance; they want help in achieving fast-paced economic growth, technological advances, and regional stability.

The European Union is far less politically controversial than NATO and much better equipped to address this broad array of concerns. Indo-Pacific policymakers should make the most of EU security and defense tools that have already proved their value in the context of the war in Ukraine and that offer an alternative path for building Asian-European cooperation in the absence of NATO. These instruments include the European Peace Facility, which coordinates the provision of military equipment to partners and EU training missions for partner countries; and the Critical Maritime Routes Indo-Pacific (CRIMARIO) project dedicated to enhancing maritime security and capacity building with Indo-Pacific partners.

These EU programs offer an effective alternative to the kind of defense cooperation NATO boosters claim the alliance could provide. Moreover, cooperating through the European Union would also open opportunities to address a wide array of security-related issues that fall outside NATO’s remit, such as protecting critical infrastructure, regulating foreign investments, and building societal resilience against disinformation and hybrid threats. Whereas NATO’s hard military focus could provoke a regional backlash, the EU’s inclusive approach is likely to garner far more support in the Indo-Pacific.

Finally, European states should work to integrate themselves more fully into the region’s security architecture. There is no one-size-fits-all solution to the security challenge presented by Beijing; states in the Indo-Pacific are building different strategies to address their China problems. Europe should lean into the region’s mix of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, including more robust collaboration with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations on issues including cybersecurity, sustainable clean energy, and supply chain resilience. It should also deepen and expand minilateral initiatives with the region, such as the trilateral initiative between France, India, and the United Arab Emirates focused on defense, technology, and climate innovation projects, or Germany and the United Kingdom’s joint efforts to address the threat Pacific Islands face from rising sea levels through the Blue Pacific Initiative.

If the objective is to effectively counter China’s growing assertiveness in Asia, militarized Western platforms are not the best answer. Instead, Asian and European countries must come together to forge more nuanced and calibrated approaches that won’t stoke further conflict—or put the region in an impossible, and potentially ruinous, position.

NATO to launch 4 projects with Indo-Pacific partners, including AI and cyber

Global 'arsenal of democracy' will help allies adapt to shifting security landscape

By Ken Moriyasu, (Nikkei Asia)

WASHINGTON -- NATO and its Indo-Pacific partners of Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand will launch four new joint projects to deepen cooperation, U.S. national security adviser Jake Sullivan told a gathering of defense industry officials Tuesday.

The projects will focus on Ukraine, artificial intelligence, disinformation and cybersecurity, Sullivan said at the first NATO Defense Industry Forum, held on the sidelines of the NATO summit in Washington and hosted by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.

"Each initiative is different, but the main goal is the same: harness the unique strengths of highly capable democracies to address shared global challenges," he explained.

"What happens in Europe impacts the Indo-Pacific," Sullivan said. "What happens in the Indo-Pacific impacts Europe."

Combining the capabilities of like-minded democracies to address the challenges posed by the likes of Russia, China and North Korea is a central topic of this year's NATO summit. Participants at the event, held on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's 75th anniversary, highlighted the changing security landscape.

For most of NATO's existence, "at most we faced a single strategic competitor that was relatively slow and lumbering," U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen Hicks said, at the forum, referring to the Soviet Union.

The security alliance now instead faces a rapid defense industrial expansion by strategic competitors, spearheaded by China.

"The transatlantic defense industrial base is at a pivotal moment," Hicks said. She described today's "arsenal of democracy" as global -- enlisting both NATO allies and Indo-Pacific partners to step up to the challenge.

Hicks said working with such Indo-Pacific partners as Australia, Japan and South Korea, on co-production of weapons and joint maintenance of ships and aircraft will benefit all.

Sullivan announced that in the coming days, all 32 NATO members will pledge to develop plans to strengthen their defense industrial capacity at home -- a first in the alliance's history.

"Like our defense spending commitment, these individual pledges are critical to our collective security," he said.

NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg highlighted how many more NATO members are crossing the threshold of spending 2% of gross domestic product on defense.

A decade ago, NATO agreed that 2% should be a goal to strive toward, the outgoing secretary-general said. Today, "2% is not only some kind of ceiling, but 2% is now ... the floor for our defense spending," he stressed.

And through the new defense industrial pledge, not only will allies spend more on defense, they will "spend better," Stoltenberg said, by "spending more together" toward such ends as utilizing economies of scale.

But integrating capabilities is not only about spending more money, but also about creating more interoperable systems via common standards, Stoltenberg said. He cited the example of Dutch-German brigades being unable to share artillery ammunition.

"And that's the opposite of interoperability, and this is something we have to take extremely seriously as government and as industry," the former Norwegian prime minister said.

Stoltenberg said that NATO will be discussing defense industry cooperation with its Indo-Pacific partners when they meet Thursday.

Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea "are all advanced defense industries," he said. "And part of what we agreed as allies will be to step up our cooperation with them, also when it comes to defense industry capability developments."

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